This paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by investigating several clean tests of the competing hypotheses. Consistent with previous work, the field experimental data suggest that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers, whereas consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions. The data indicate that the convergence in values occurs entirely because of lower Hicksian equivalent surplus values.
I. Introduction
Neoclassical models involve several fundamental postulates. While most of the basic tenets appear to be reasonably met, the basic independence assumption-that preferences are independent of the consumer's current entitlements-has been directly refuted in several experimental settings (see, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990) . Although numerous theories have been advanced to explain this anomaly, perhaps the most accepted conjecture invokes psychological effects, and is broadly termed "prospect theory" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Recently, some work examining behavior in naturally occurring markets has suggested that over time consumers learn, and their behavior more closely matches predictions from neoclassical models (List, 2003; 2004a , 2004b . 1 Yet this work relies primarily on examining trading patterns in markets rather than statements of value, the more important concept for many normative and positive implications. From a positive perspective, a large disparity between Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating surplus essentially renders the invariance result of Coase invalid (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1993) . In a normative sense, a value disparity calls into question commonly held interpretations of indifference curves, makes cost/benefit analysis illegitimate, and change the procedure necessary to resolve damage disputes.
The goal of this study is to extend the experimental learning results by examining the shape and structure of Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating 1 Evidence of the learning effect has also been found in laboratory experiments. For example, in a recent study Myagkov and Plott (1997) create an exchange economy in which exposure to loss can be exchanged. If people are loss averse and risk seeking in loss space, "insurance" should sell for less than its fair value and exchanges should occur on the boundaries. Consistent with prospect theory, they find evidence of both phenomena, but the former is attenuated with experience. Considering that useful cognitive capital most likely builds up slowly over months or years rather than in the limited duration of a laboratory experiment (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) , it is understandable that experience in the lab does not attenuate all aspects of loss aversion. This notion highlights the importance of examining behavior in naturally occurring environments.
surplus measures in a well-functioning marketplace. 2 In this spirit, while the earlier literature examined trading decisions over single items (e.g., sportscards, sports memorabilia, pins, candy bars, and coffee mugs), this study explores curvature of the value function, which necessitates valuation of a number of items. This approach permits a stark test of the competing theories because in such cases the two major theories have contradictory predictions. Prospect theory predicts that Hicksian equivalent surplus will exceed Hicksian compensating surplus and that compensation demanded is concave in the number of relinquished goods due to "diminishing sensitivity." Neoclassical theory predicts equivalence of surplus measures and that compensation demanded is convex in the number of relinquished goods due to quasi-concavity of preferences. In this respect, the experimental design is rare, as it provides a unique test that directly pits the two theories. In addition, the data allow an exploration of the source of the behavior and how experience interacts with valuation decisions. 3 These predictions are tested using experimental data from actual auctions run in a marketplace. The auction treatments were constructed to provide data that permit a comparison of surplus values as well as a measure of the shape of compensation demanded (equivalent surplus) in the number of relinquished goods. The empirical results provide two major insights. First, whereas Hicksian equivalent surplus is considerably larger than Hicksian compensating surplus for inexperienced agents, the difference converges to zero for experienced agents. Interestingly, the observed convergence is 2 I exercise care when claiming that I am observing behavior in a well-functioning marketplace. Borrowing the terminology of Harrison and List (2004) , a more accurate description of my experimental design is that of a "framed" field experiment. 3 To my best knowledge, there has been (i) no previous effort examining the effect of market experience on the shape of compensation demanded and (ii) no evidence gathered on shapes of compensation demanded in framed field experiments. entirely due to lower Hicksian equivalent surplus values among experienced agents.
Second, consistent with this insight, compensation demanded is convex (concave) in the number of items being relinquished for experienced (inexperienced) agents. My preferred interpretation is that the data pattern observed suggests that the learning process at work is one where the psychological effects at the heart of prospect theory are gradually attenuated: experienced agents are more willing to part with their endowments than lesser-experienced agents.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. The next section provides a theoretical discussion and the experimental design to test the competing hypotheses.
Sections III and IV present the results and conclusions.
II. Theory and Experimental Design
Ever since the initial experimental findings that suggested that mere ownership of a good may induce an endowment effect, neoclassical models have been under heavy scrutiny, as their basic independence assumption is clearly violated in such scenarios. Yet a related line of research suggests that this important behavioral pattern is attenuated when agents obtain market experience (Knez, Smith, and Williams, 1985; Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze, 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Myagkov and Plott, 1997; List, 2003; 2004a , 2004b . suggesting that certain classes of consumers derive utility merely from trading (perhaps this is the reason they participate in the sportscard market in the first place). With an eye toward testing the competing hypotheses side-by-side, and more fully exploring learning effects over statements of value, I turn to the experimental design, which permits an analysis of explicit statements of willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay 4 Unless one wishes to invoke more stringent assumptions on the convexity of the value function in the loss domain across goods, comparing individual decisions across points B and C are not enlightening. 5 While the data in this study do not discern between treatment effects (market experience or learning effects) versus selection effects (subject pool), List (2003) presents evidence that suggests that learning (market experience) is important. This inference follows from a panel data regression that he ran: he observed trading decisions of sports memorabilia for the same agents at two points in time, controlled for selection effects in the regression, and found that market experience and the decision to trade were correlated. Thus, I follow this learning (market experience) conjecture in the discussion, and exchange learning and market experience as the reasons for the change in behavior.
(WTP) in an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism: a Vickrey sealed bid 2 nd price auction. 6 Figure 2, which assumes quasi-concave utility functions, illustrates the experimental design (which is closely related to Horowitz, McConnell, and Quiggin (1999) ). In Figure 2 , G represents extra large fine Swiss chocolate bars and $ denotes dollars (note that while numerical subscripts on g represent number of candy bars, subscripts on $ are for notational convenience only and do not depict actual dollar figures). To obtain statements of value, I randomly endowed subjects at (g 0 ,$ 3 ) or (g 3 ,$ 0 ). Each of the subjects knew that only one of the three auctions, to be determined randomly, would be carried out for real.
Note that a simple exercise of randomly allocating subjects at (g 3, $ 0 ) and (g 0, $ 0 ) and eliciting minimum WTA and maximum WTP values does not yield tremendous insights since both prospect theory and neoclassical theory predict a value disparity.
Neoclassical theory predicts divergence due to income (shifts in the indifference curve) and substitution (curvature of the indifference curves) effects. This can be seen in Figure   2 via WTA 3 =$ 3 -$ 0 > WTP 3 =$ 0 -$ 4 . Prospect theory invokes psychological effects to predict divergences. Thus, it is important to control for Hicksian income and substitution effects by compensating WTP subjects to ensure that subjects are moving along the same indifference curve. The amount of compensation used in the WTP treatment is the average WTA 3 (i.e., the average dollar value from the WTA 3 auction). And, to ensure the proper compensation, I completed the WTA treatment prior to beginning the WTP treatment. 7
The treatments were run on the floor of a sportscard show in Tucson, Arizona.
Each participant's experience followed four steps: (1) completing a survey, (2) learning the auction rules, (3) considering the bid (offer), and (4) concluding the transaction and exit interview. In Step 1, the monitor approached individuals entering the trading card
show and inquired about their interest in filling out a survey. 8 If the individual agreed, then the monitor explained that in return for completing the survey the subject would receive an endowment (either three candy bars or the average WTA 3 -see above). After the monitor physically gave the subject the appropriate endowment, the subject proceeded to fill out the survey. The monitor worked one-on-one with the participant and no time limit was imposed. In Step 2, the monitor informed the subject that she now had the opportunity to bid (offer) in an auction for the goods on the table (their goods). After inspecting the goods, the subject learned the rules of the Vickrey 2 nd price auction as well as the randomization mechanism (Appendix B contains the WTP experimental instructions).
In the WTP (WTA) treatment, after completing the survey, learning the auction rules, and examining the goods, each participant privately wrote three bids (offers) on the bidding sheet and placed it in an opaque box. The monitor informed the participant that 7 Thus, when I refer to "randomization" into treatment, the reader should be aware that subjects in the WTA auctions arrived at the show later in the day than the subjects in the WTP auctions arrived. 8 The survey is contained in Appendix A.
her bidding sheet would not be opened until after the show and that all bids/offers would be destroyed when the research project was completed. Each subject worked one-on-one with the monitor and no time limit was imposed on her inspection of the goods. In Step 4, the monitor explained that if the participant won the auction, she would be contacted by email or telephone within three days. Upon receipt of payment, the monitor would send her the candy bars (or money), postage paid.
Before proceeding, I should mention a few important aspects of the experimental design. First, subjects were randomly placed into either the WTA or WTP treatment, and competed against others in the same treatment. Second, no subject participated in more than one treatment. Third, since I am not testing the incentive-compatibility of the mechanism, and want to avoid any excess noise, I informed subjects that it was in their best interest to bid (offer) their true value in the auctions. I reinforced this notion via several examples that illustrated the optimal strategy of truth-telling.
Theoretical Predictions
Across these auction treatments neoclassical theory and prospect theory have quite disparate predictions. A first difference in predictions is that neoclassical theory Alternatively, prospect theory conjectures that a value function exists that is (i) measured over deviations from a reference point, (ii) convex for losses and concave for gains, and (iii) initially steeper for losses than for gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991 ).
Hence, a major conjecture of prospect theory is diminishing sensitivity, or that small gains are disproportionately more attractive relative to large gains, and small losses disproportionately aversive relative to large losses. Intuitively, convexity of the value function in losses is motivated by the idea that the decline in value from a loss of $1100
to a loss of $1200 is less than the decline in value from a loss of $100 to a loss of $200.
In this sense, prospect theory predicts concavity of the compensation demanded function if the convexity of the value function for the auctioned good in the loss domain is sufficiently large relative to the concavity of the value function for money in the gain domain. In this case, which seems plausible given empirical results in the literature, prospect theory again has predictions that are directly at odds with neoclassical theory: Table 1 provides a statistical description of the subject characteristics in both treatments.
III. Results
Standard deviations of the variables reveal that there is a considerable amount of subject variability in the level of trading intensity and years of market experience, permitting an analysis of the effect of market experience on behavior. In the data analysis below, I
focus on the effects of trading intensity on behavior. Yet I should note that if I use a measure of the stock of market experience-the product of trading intensity and years of market experience-empirical results are qualitatively similar. 12 Table 2 provides sample statistics for WTA and WTP measures of value across several experience thresholds. In choosing thresholds for these samples, I considered both the mean number of trades in a typical month (5) and its standard deviation (5). A first important insight gained from Table 2 is the discrepancy between
Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating surplus for the three candy bars in the pooled data (row 1). While compensation demanded is $14.78, WTP is only $7.73.
inf{$p|$S(g 0 +(1-)g 1 )} because S(g 0 ) + (1-) S(g 1 )  S(g 0 +(1-)g 1 ). Therefore, the expenditure function is convex in g (see Maler, 1974) . 11 I should note that I am not the first to examine shapes of compensation demanded-see Brookshire and Coursey (1987) for an early example of a study that gathered statements of compensation demanded. For a more recent treatment see Horowitz et al. (1999) , who conduct similar exercises to those herein. 12 The astute reader will note that the survey asked "Approximately how many trades (cards or memorabilia) do you make in a typical month? _______. Note that trades could include pokemon cards, sportscards, other trading cards, and sports memorabilia." While "trades" might appear to be a vague term (i.e., perhaps it includes money-for-goods transactions), in this marketplace the terminology "trade" is ubiquitously recognized to be a good(s)-for-good(s) transaction.
This value difference is significant at the p < .01 level using a large-sample t-test (t = 6.30) and suggests that preferences are inconsistent. 13 Parsing the data into subcategories yields interesting insights: predictions from prospect theory are met in the inexperienced consumer group, as WTA 3 ($18.36 same subject groups provides negligible value differences ($7.54 versus $7.43).
Interestingly, WTP is concave in g for all subsamples, as predicted by both theories.
A further test of the two theories requires a more careful exploration of the curvature of Hicksian equivalent surplus measures over the number of relinquished goods. Table 3 presents summary statistics across the curvature measures for each of the subsamples. Panel A in Table 3 provides means and standard deviations for the measures:
13 These results, and those discussed below, are consistent across parametric and non-parametric tests. 14 Recall that all subjects randomly allocated into the WTP treatment received the average offer from the WTA 3 treatment. Considering the mean WTA values across subject types, some subjects were likely overendowed (experienced consumers) while others were likely under-endowed (inexperienced consumers). This design decision, therefore, may have compromising effects if subjects' WTP is highly responsive to this change in wealth. To address this potential shortcoming, I returned to the same marketplace and ran three ancillary WTP treatments where I first determined bidders' experience levels, and then endowed agents according to the WTA values in Table 2 ( $18.36, $10.10, and $8.21) . Using data from more than 50 agents, results are qualitatively identical to those in Data gathered from the experienced and intense consumers provide evidence that supports neoclassical theory-convexity of compensation demanded is evident. For experienced consumers, the differences are significant at the p < .05 level for the first two column measures and at the p < .08 and p < .15 levels for the last two column measures.
For intense consumers the results are sharper, as significance is achieved at the p < .05 level for the first three measures and at the p < .12 level for the fourth measure.
Panel B in Table 3 find that for all four curvature measures these differences are significant at the p < .05
level. Fourth, 50-72 percent (16-22 percent) of intense consumers conform to neoclassical predictions (prospect theory predictions). Again, a proportions test indicates that in all four curvature cases these differences are significant at the p < .05 level.
Finally, comparing the proportion of subjects who conform to neoclassical theory or prospect theory across the inexperienced and experienced consumer samples, I find that for each of the four curvature measures, experienced (inexperienced) consumers are significantly more likely to behave in accordance with neoclassical theory (prospect theory) than inexperienced (experienced) consumers.
Although analysis of the raw data provides evidence suggesting that market experience and offer curvature are correlated, there has been no attempt to control other factors that may affect the bid/offer level. To provide conditional insights into the auction data, I estimate the following bid/offer model:
where Y is subject i's bid or offer; and X includes subject-specific variables that may affect the bid or offer: trading intensity, years of market experience, gender, income, education, and age. For the WTP equation, I use a Tobit specification since there are zero bids in the data.
Summary estimates are presented in Table 4 Combining insights gained across the statistical analyses provides the following insight: while prospect theory can go a long way in explaining behavior of "naïve" subjects, behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as subjects gain market experience. To see this, consider Figure 3 , which provides a summary of individual behavior across the WTA and WTP treatments. The figure includes data across the 120 subjects and makes the WTA/WTP ratio a function of trading intensity. Figure 3 clearly shows that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies. In light of the extant body of psychological evidence that reports limited transfer of learning across tasks, these results are quite surprising given that these consumers have seemingly overcome the endowment effect in situations beyond specific problems they have previously encountered. 16 The richness of the data also permits an examination of the underlying learning process. In this sense, the results in this study rule out many potential explanations that could not be entirely discarded in previous data sets (List, 2003; 2004a) . For example, preference uncertainty and subjects obtaining utility from the trading exercise cannot credibly explain the auction results herein. Yet the data are broadly consistent with at least one potential explanation: via market interaction and numerous arbitrage opportunities, practiced agents have learned to overcome the "pain" of selling and treat the good leaving their endowment as an opportunity cost rather than a loss (see also Loewenstein and Kahneman, 1991) . While psychological effects have been extremely popular in explaining the endowment effect anomaly, the data herein suggest that psychological effects may also help to explain the attenuation of the anomaly.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Indifference curves are traditionally drawn without reference to current entitlements. In practice, this convention implies that with small income effects and many available substitutes, differences between equivalent and compensating variation are negligible.
From a positive perspective, this assumption represents a necessary condition for the invariance result of Coase. In a normative sense, this interpretation of indifference curves legitimizes cost/benefit analysis and provides a basis to resolve damage disputes. Yet 16 One potential explanation of this result revolves around the experience gained by participants in this market. Their experience is that items-of all sorts in this marketplace-in their possession are not necessarily consumed. In this sense, candy bars and mugs might not be too dissimilar from sportscards and sports memorabilia.
substantial evidence has mounted that illustrates the importance of entitlements: in an influential experimental study, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) provide compelling evidence to reject the basic independence assumption. These experimental findings have been robust across unfamiliar goods, such as irradiated sandwiches, and common goods, such as chocolate bars, persuading some of the most ardent supporters of neoclassical theory to doubt the validity of certain neoclassical postulates.
In this study, I make use of data from a framed field experiment to perform several clean tests that pit neoclassical theory against prospect theory. Several insights are obtained. First, prospect theory is found to have strong predictive power for inexperienced consumers. Second, for those consumers who have had a considerable amount of exchange opportunity in the sportscard marketplace, neoclassical theory predicts reasonably well: I find sharp evidence that behavior approaches the neoclassical prediction for experienced agents. In light of the extant body of psychological evidence that reports limited transfer of learning across tasks (Loewenstein, 1999) , these results are surprising. The tentative conclusion regarding the underlying learning process at work is that agents with intense market experience have learned to part with their entitlements, suggesting that attenuation of the anomaly appears to take place on the sell side of the market rather than on the buy side. 17 More research in this area is certainly necessary to explore the generality of the results herein. Note: "Inexperienced" consumers are those subjects that trade fewer than 5 times in a typical month; "Experienced" consumers are those subjects that trade 5 or more times in a typical month; "Intense" consumers are those subjects that trade 10 or more times per month. In choosing these thresholds, I considered both the mean number of trades in a typical month (5) and its standard deviation (5) (see Table 1 ). Thus, "Inexperienced" consumers are those subjects who are below the average trading rate; "Experienced" consumers are those subjects who are above the average trading rate; and "Intense" consumers are those consumers at least one standard deviation above the average trading rate. Table 2 . NT and PT denote neoclassical theory and prospect theory. Figures in Panel B on the number of subjects following each theory are determined by the signs of the four measures: WTA 2 -2WTA 1 , WTA 3 -3WTA 1 , 2WTA 3 -3WTA 2 , and 2WTA 2 -WTA 1 -WTA 3 . A positive value (implying convexity in the number of goods relinquished) is in favor of neoclassical theory whereas a negative value (implying concavity in the number of goods relinquished) favors prospect theory. A zero value indicates linearity and is not counted as following either theory; hence, the summation of the number of subjects following NT and PT for each convexity measure is not equal to the total number of subjects that participated. In panel A, a * indicates value is significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level. 
